#Japanese Military Policy

[tmarshconnors]

Abe Shinzo: A Great Leader Two Years On

Two years have passed since the state funeral of former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, an event that marked the end of a remarkable era for Japan and the world. As we reflect on his legacy, it’s clear that Abe was not only a transformative figure in Japan’s modern history but also a significant player on the global stage. His death in July 2022 was a tragedy that shook the nation and left an indelible mark on the international community.

Abe Shinzo: A Visionary Leader

Abe Shinzo served as Japan's longest-serving Prime Minister, holding office from 2006 to 2007 and again from 2012 to 2020. His second term, in particular, was marked by a strong vision for Japan's future, rooted in a philosophy that combined economic revitalization with a more assertive global presence. Abe's economic policy, commonly referred to as "Abenomics," sought to pull Japan out of decades of stagnation through bold monetary policies, fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms. Although controversial at times, Abenomics reshaped Japan's economy, focusing on growth and international competitiveness.

Abe was also a leader with a strategic vision for Japan’s place in the world. His efforts to strengthen Japan’s military and revise its pacifist post-war constitution reflected his deep understanding of the evolving security dynamics in East Asia. He recognized the growing threats from North Korea and China, and his leadership ensured that Japan became a more active and respected player in international diplomacy. His work in cementing the U.S.-Japan alliance as a cornerstone of regional stability is perhaps one of his greatest foreign policy achievements.

The State Funeral: A Nation’s Farewell

Abe's state funeral, held on September 27, 2022, was a sombre and grand affair, attended by dignitaries and leaders from around the world. The ceremony, held at the Nippon Budokan in Tokyo, was a moment for Japan to bid farewell to one of its most significant post-war leaders. The funeral sparked intense public debate in Japan, with some questioning the cost and the very idea of holding a state funeral for Abe. Yet, the outpouring of grief and respect from world leaders underscored the global impact of Abe’s legacy.

For many Japanese citizens, the state funeral was an opportunity to reflect on the stability and prosperity that Abe’s leadership had brought to the country. His tenure was far from uncontroversial, yet there was a recognition that Abe had brought Japan through difficult times with a steady hand, leaving behind a legacy that will be remembered for generations.

A Missing Presence on the World Stage

As we look back two years after his death, one cannot help but feel that Abe Shinzo’s absence is still felt on the global stage. In a world increasingly marked by geopolitical tensions, his diplomatic expertise and strategic thinking are sorely missed. Abe was a bridge-builder, known for fostering strong relationships with the West while maintaining open lines of communication with countries like Russia and China. He understood the delicate balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region and navigated these waters with skill.

One of Abe’s most lasting achievements was the creation of the Quad, a strategic security dialogue between Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. This alliance, aimed at countering China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, is now a cornerstone of regional security and a testament to Abe’s foresight.

Remembering a Giant

As the world continues to face new challenges, from the rise of authoritarianism to the shifting global economy, the kind of leadership that Abe exemplified is sorely needed. His commitment to democracy, his respect for Japan’s rich history and culture, and his willingness to stand firm in the face of global challenges set him apart as a leader for the ages.

In remembering Abe Shinzo, we must not only reflect on what he accomplished but also on the values he stood for. He believed in a strong, independent Japan that was an active and engaged member of the global community. His leadership inspired both admiration and criticism, but there is no denying the lasting impact he had on Japan and the world.

Two years after his death, we miss Abe Shinzo not just as a leader but as a voice of reason and stability in a world that desperately needs both. His legacy lives on, not only in the policies he enacted but in the continued importance of Japan on the world stage. Abe’s Japan was a country that could look forward with pride and confidence, and that is the legacy we must carry forward.

[bijoumikhawal]

*sees a long post from an American comparing Cardassia to the USSR/China* *rolls eyes and keeps scrolling*

[cartanacia]

Some background on South Korean politics in light of the 12.3 self-coup attempt

At 10:23 PM on 12.3, President Yoon Suk-yeol (Yun Seokyeol) declared martial law. The Korean people and MPs immediately mobilized to stop it. Although a group of special forces stormed the Parliament building and tried to break up legislative activity, 190 MPs made it into the chamber and voted only two hours later to rescind martial law. Soon after that, Yoon agreed to end martial law and the military officially stood down.

This was a bizarre and shocking few hours for everyone in the country and the world, and how Yoon got to the point of making this absurd decision is an interesting story. To tell it, I'll try to explain 1) South Korea's history of military rule, 2) Yoon's prosecutorial and political career, 3) the main opposition Together Democratic Party, and 4) Yoon's presidency. And finally, 5) what the self-coup attempt means for South Korea and the world.

I'll try to be brief as I can, but I'm starting from the assumption that most people know very little about South Korean politics. So, it's a long post.

Military rule

After fascist Japan surrendered at the end of WW2, it handed over power in the occupied Korean peninsula to an indigenous government called the People's Republic of Korea. Unfortunately, the new government was brutally suppressed by the US military in the South and warped into unrecognizable form by the Soviet Union in the North. In the South, the Republic of Korea was established as a US-aligned anticommunist dictatorship. Everything in this summary is extremely simplified, but suffice it to say that the Republic of Korea, or South Korea, more or less remained an anticommunist military dictatorship until 1987.

(One of the less graphic pictures of the Bodo League massacre, where the South Korean police and military killed 200,000 civilians)

Military rule in South Korea was founded on protecting South Korean capitalists, many of which had accumulated their wealth under the Japanese occupation, from the dual threats of leftists in South Korea and North Korean attack. South Korea retained the vast majority of colonial police employed by the occupation government, whose main purpose had been to root out and destroy independence guerillas, and repurposed them to root out and destroy left-wing guerillas (many of which were the same people). This caused an extraordinary level of state violence in early South Korean history. The South Korean prosecution service was similarly used to find and imprison or kill the opposition. Due to their function as part of an authoritarian state, the prosecution service was given broad powers to both investigate and prosecute.

Especially after President Park Chung-hee (Bak Jeonghui) took power (by overthrowing another short-lived democratic government), the South Korean state's purpose became not only to protect capital, but also to direct its expansion. The South Korean state used its control over credit to make companies invest in sectors that it predicted would have great export potential. Once a company established itself in a sector, the state directed it to use the profit it got from exports to invest in another, more capital-intensive sector. Over decades, this strategy led to enormous economic growth for South Korea and a massive rise in living standards. It also caused a few companies in particular to become fantastically wealthy global megacorporations. These are the chaebols (jaebeol), which include Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and others.

By 1987, a series of massive democratic protests and uprisings finally ended the dictatorship. A free election was held, and a general named Noh Tae-woo (No Taeu) was elected president. In the new democratic era, the conservative movement was formed as an alliance of dictatorship figures like Noh, chaebols, small businesses, and white collar workers who wanted to continue the economic policies of the dictatorship. The democratization movement continued as various incarnations of the Democratic Party (South Korean political parties change names and split and merge constantly), made up of unions, civil society activists, and students. Leftists have continued to be a minor force in South Korean politics, but for the purposes of this post I'll mostly set them aside. The main groups we're concerned with are conservatives and democrats, organized into a constantly shifting mush of political parties.

Supreme Prosecutor of the Republic

Before he became president, Yoon Seok-yeol was the Supreme Prosecutor of the prosecution service. To understand the significance of this, we have to take a look at the prosecution service in the democratic era and the political environment that Yoon emerged into.

During the dictatorship, everyone hated the police. So after the dictatorship, South Korea thoroughly reformed and defanged the police. This was a genuine success of the democratization movement. The police were turned from a gang of brutal thugs into an organization that almost never uses guns and is known for getting yelled at and beaten up by random citizens. If you hit a South Korean cop, the cop might be punished for annoying you. (Though the situation is different for ethnic minorities and striking workers.)

On the other hand, the prosecution service was left mostly untouched. While it obviously was no longer used for open political repression, it largely retained its broad investigative powers and personnel.

To put it simply, the prosecution service is an authoritarian holdover inside a democracy. It justifies its powers by being a hammer against the most powerful members of society. In South Korea, it's common for politicians of all parties to have their houses raided or be put in prison. This happens regularly even to former presidents, and even to some of the wealthiest people in the world, the heads of the chaebols. These things are unthinkable in most Western democracies. Whether you think these powers are justified or not, they've led to the prosecution service having far more active influence over politics than prosecutors in most democracies. As far as the prosecutors were concerned, that made them the heroes of this story.

These things came to a head in 2016 with conservative President Park Geun-hye (Bak Geunhye). Due to a series of massive scandals, Park had become extremely unpopular, with her approval rating hovering at 30 percent. What put the nail in the coffin for Park was an investigation by a prosecutor named Yoon Seok-yeol. Yoon exposed bizarre corruption involving President Park, Samsung, and a cult that had been involved with her family since the presidency of her father, Park Chung-hee. This led to massive protests and Park Geun-hye's impeachment.

(2016 Candlelight Protests)

The president who succeeded Park, Moon Jae-in, promoted Yoon within the prosecution service. At his new position, Yoon prosecuted and imprisoned Park, as well as another conservative former president. At this point, he was becoming a major public figure, popular among democrats and hated among conservatives. So President Moon promoted Yoon again, this time to Supreme Prosecutor of the entire service.

And then, Yoon started investigating Moon's own justice minister. This led to a public dispute. Moon's government looked corrupt and hypocritical, and Yoon became more popular than ever. Soon, Yoon resigned his office and entered the conservative presidential primary.

Of course, conservatives welcomed Yoon's entry, and he won the primary and the presidency. But how did they go from hating him for destroying their president to fighting to get him elected? How did Yoon go from prosecuting a corrupt conservative to being one?

The reason for the switch from Park to Yoon lies in their political brands.

Park Geun-hye's brand was built on nostalgia for her authoritarian father. Many older South Koreans associate Park Chung-hee's regime with stability, rational economic management, and anticommunism. At the same time, even most conservative voters hate actual authoritarian behavior. All South Koreans have either lived under military dictatorship or have heard from their family what it was like, and almost nobody is eager to return. Once Park Geun-hye's corruption and inept attempts at election manipulation were revealed, she was finished.

This is why conservatives welcomed Yoon Suk-yeol into their party: they needed him to wash their hands of corruption. He was a rebirth of authoritarian discipline made acceptable by his prosecution of unpopular conservatives. His message was law and order: if we lock up the corrupt, criminals, and communists, the country can be saved from ruin. If we push workers harder (by increasing work hours), economic growth will continue. If we push women harder (by forcing a return to traditional gender roles), the birth rate will return to normal. And, of course, the chaebols should be deregulated and given tax cuts.

Together Democratic Party

Before we pick things back up with Yoon, his main opposition is worth a look. This is the Together Democratic Party, which along with other opposition parties blocked the declaration of martial law and is now pushing for Yoon's impeachment.

We can summarize the Democratic Party's traditional and typical outlook in the figure of President Moon Jae-in (Mun Jaein). This was Park Geun-hye's main rival and the president who promoted Yoon Seok-yeol. He can be considered something like the "Korean Barack Obama". He was liked by democrats and called a dangerous communist by conservatives, but he didn't do all that much in reality other than raising the minimum wage, reducing the workweek, and attempting diplomacy with North Korea. He is now generally liked because things felt normal, he handled the COVID-19 pandemic well, and he didn't make any earth-shattering mistakes. He's the only living president not to be imprisoned after leaving office.

For decades, the Democratic Party was this type of moderate reformist, center-right party. However, in just the past few years, the party has gone through a considerable transformation.

(A 2017 Democratic presidential primary debate, with Lee on the left and Moon on the right.)

The Democratic Party has now unquestionably become the party of a person named Lee Jae-myung (Yi Jaemyeong), who was elected party leader in 2022. He's been called the "Korean Bernie Sanders", and this label is at least somewhat accurate.

Like Bernie Sanders, Lee Jae-myung can be characterized as a radical social democrat. His policies could actually be characterized as more radical than Bernie Sanders'. As the governor of Gyeonggi Province, Lee introduced a youth basic income and experimented with universal basic income. As a national political figure, Lee pushes for what he calls his "Basic Society" policies. These include universal basic income, youth basic income, universal basic housing (by massively expanding public housing), expanding free healthcare coverage to nursing, free meals for seniors, and a four day workweek. In general, Lee criticizes means-tested welfare and advocates for universal programs that guarantee a baseline standard of living by right.

On the other hand, Lee could also be characterized as less radical than his policies would imply. A common criticism, which ironically comes from both conservatives and leftists, is that he doesn't often talk about how to pay for his policies. Conservatives see this as a sign of irresponsible populism and economic illiteracy, while leftists criticize him for not naming the enemy. Unlike Bernie Sanders, Lee doesn't rail against chaebols or inequality or push for taxes on the rich. He also tends to appeal to questionable technology like AI rather than collective action. So although Lee champions some genuinely radical policies, he certainly isn't a socialist.

Lee's public image is also quite different from someone like Bernie Sanders. Lee is generally seen as a figure of questionable morality due to a constant conveyor belt of personal scandals and corruption allegations. He has been accused of, among other things, abusing his staff, having his brother involuntarily committed, illegally sending money to North Korea using an underwear factory, and having connections to organized crime. Lee's personal legal controversies have been the greatest source of instability for him and the Democratic Party since he became its leader.

In fact, Lee was recently convicted of lying while campaigning in one of his trials in November. Due to now having a criminal conviction, he is technically barred from running for office again. However, the conviction could still be overturned on appeal and recent events have really thrown everything up in the air. And even if Lee himself can't run for office, his ideology has taken over the Democratic Party and it's likely that whoever succeeds him will share it.

So, Lee Jae-myung is the nemesis that Yoon Seok-yeol has been fighting for his whole presidency. A criminal versus a prosecutor. Universalism versus austerity. Relief versus discipline.

Yoon Suk-yeol's presidency

Finally, we return to President Yoon. Though even as a prosecutor he was a figure of questionable intelligence, as a politician he's revealed himself to be one of the most inept people in modern history.

Since the beginning of his term, Yoon has been unable to do nearly anything at all domestically. The Democratic Party already had a majority in Parliament at the beginning of his presidency, and so Yoon has been unable to enact literally any part of his legislative agenda. Instead, he was reduced to calling young people lazy, bemoaning the far too short workweek, and wishing he could cut welfare.

In April of 2024, parliamentary elections were held. Lee Jae-myung, Democratic party leader, used the primary process as an opportunity to purge the party of centrists. Despite the Democratic Party's parliamentary candidates being further left than they'd ever been, opposition parties expanded their hold over the Parliament and nearly won a supermajority. After their victory, Lee Jae-myung was reelected as party leader and Basic Society advocates were elected to every seat on the party's supreme council. The Democratic Party emerged more left-wing, more ideologically unified, and more powerful than it ever had been before.

Now that Lee's Basic Society ideology had consolidated its hold on the Democratic Party and the Parliament, the Parliament began trying to pass its agenda in earnest. The Parliament passed bills establishing an experimental UBI, preventing companies from suing workers for striking, and expanding labor protections to subcontractors, among others. Over and over, Yoon vetoed them. Yoon has vetoed 19 bills and pocket-vetoed 4 more, more than every other South Korean president combined.

Both Yoon and the Parliament accused each other of being obstructionists. The problem for Yoon was that the Parliament's policies were popular, while his policies were unpopular. As Yoon issued more and more vetoes, his approval rating only fell.

(A political cartoon by Bak Sunchan depicting Yoon as a lame duck saying "veto")

Without the ability to change domestic policy, Yoon put all of his energy into foreign policy. Due to their history and composition, conservatives want to maintain trading links with other developed countries and developing countries for the chaebols to export to, want to maintain anticommunist alliances with the US and Japan, and are hostile to North Korea. (Participation in this system is what led the South Korean military to commit atrocities in Vietnam.) Democrats are somewhat skeptical of both the US and Japan, and want reconciliation with North Korea. Yoon has been strengthening relations with the US and Japan, sending weapons to Ukraine, and taking a hard line against North Korea.

Although several of these efforts were unpopular, the most significant has probably been Yoon allowing Japan to list the Sado gold mine as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Before Yoon, South Korea had been blocking this because the site failed to mention the thousands of Korean slaves forced to work in the mine during WW2.

So, the two years of Yoon's presidency had so far consisted of Yoon obstructing popular reforms while failing to pass unpopular reforms and engaging in unpopular war crime denialism. He was generally regarded as impotent, laughable, and annoying. And at the same time, allegations of Yoon's own corruption grew louder and louder.

Yoon's wife is accused of taking bribes and meddling in the conservative primary. Yoon's friend, a Marine Corps officer, is accused of negligence that resulted in a young conscript's death. Yoon is accused of using his friends in the prosecution service to interfere with both investigations. As these scandals grew, the Parliament passed bills appointing special prosecutors independent from the prosecution service to investigate them. Many of Yoon's vetoes were of these special prosecutor bills.

Since the parliamentary elections in April, Yoon has been stuck in a vicious cycle. The Parliament passes popular legislation and Yoon vetoes it. Yoon's approval rating falls. The Parliament passes a bill to investigate Yoon and Yoon vetoes it. More information and leaks about Yoon's corruption come out. Yoon's approval rating falls, eventually to 18 percent. Afraid of the public pressure, more conservative MPs distance themselves from Yoon.

It seemed inevitable that eventually, enough conservative MPs would defect to override Yoon's veto and appoint a special prosecutor. A special prosecutor would find evidence of Yoon's corruption. The public would grow only angrier with Yoon. The only road left would be impeachment and imprisonment, just like Park Geun-hye. Yoon bashed his head against the wall, unable to find a way out.

Clearly, somewhere in this pile was the final straw. On 12.3 at 10:23 PM, Yoon Seok-yeol turned on the camera and vomited blood.

So, what does the coup mean?

The declaration of martial law was so bewildering because it felt like it came out of nowhere. But that's not strictly true; the Democratic Party had been warning that Yoon was plotting to declare martial law for months. Most people dismissed this as a conspiracy theory, including myself. It was simply too far-fetched and illogical to contemplate, until it happened.

But the real reason it felt like it came out of nowhere was because, at the same time, it did. Not even Yoon's most devoted supporters were thinking about martial law. Apparently, everyone from the leader of Yoon's party to the Ministry of Defense to his own prime minister was caught totally by surprise. He circulated no conspiracy theories in advance, and not a single news network attempted to justify his actions. He had no cult of personality and no party ready to fall unquestioningly behind him. In short, he acted essentially alone. As soon as people rose up in defiance, he had no choice but to back down.

It's a good sign for South Korean democracy that the people defeated the self-coup attempt so quickly and decisively. But compare the political environment with that of other countries. How normal has authoritarianism become? How many people openly wish for a dictator? How subservient are the cabinet officials and the news networks? How cultlike are the major parties and how acquiescent is the opposition? These conditions make a country much more vulnerable to a ruler with authoritarian instincts. And we should expect authoritarians to act in creative and unprecedented ways.

The self-coup is an explosion of the authoritarian tendencies that have been bubbling under the surface of the conservative movement since the end of military rule. It's a decisive discrediting of Yoon's prosecutorial brand, which had been conservatism's last hope to maintain the people's trust. Yoon's impeachment and imprisonment are all but guaranteed. And the general consensus among both democrats and conservatives now is that Yoon's blunder has killed conservatism in South Korea for at least the next decade.

In fact, the 12.3 declaration of martial law might really have been a successful self-coup. In that the conservatives have removed themselves from power. And the death of the right is a golden opportunity that Korean leftists must seize. If Lee Jae-myung's Democratic Party becomes politically dominant, it must be challenged from the left to properly name the enemy. If the Basic Society policies become normalized, the left should treat them as common sense and demand more. When people become disenchanted with the democrats, the left must be ready as their competitor and obvious alternative, not the right.

Could South Korea see a new era of competition between a socialist left that wants to finally do away with the chaebols, a social democratic center that merely wants UBI, and a nonexistent right?

Maybe. Probably not. But a new world of possibilities has opened up.

[mesetacadre]

In February, 1945, when the USSR agreed at Yalta to join the Allies in the war on Japan, it was decided to divide Korea into two zones for purposes of military action. The Russians took the north, the Americans the south. The following July, at Potsdam, the 38th parallel was chosen as the “great divide.” Korea was a victim of Japanese aggression, not an enemy. We would come as liberators, not as conquerors. The military occupation was to end within a year of victory, followed by about five years of civilian trusteeship in which all the Big Four Powers, America, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China, should help Korea to her feet. That was the plan. The reality proved otherwise. The growing cold war against the Soviet Union made Korea also a base. The two zones solidified into two areas of military occupation. Friction continues to grow. When American troops landed in South Korea, September 7, 1945, thousands of Koreans danced and cheered and shouted: “Mansai,” or “Live a Thousand Years.” Within six months surly Koreans were demanding how soon the Americans would go home. Within a year great uprisings took place in eighty cities and in hundreds of farming villages against the “police state” that the American armed forces kept in power. When the Americans landed in Korea, the Koreans had already a de facto government. A “People’s Republic” had been declared a day earlier by a congress of Koreans themselves. General John R. Hodge, commander of the U. S. armed forces, dissolved this “People’s Republic,” and drove most of its members underground. Two days after landing, Hodge announced to the Koreans – who had waited a quarter of a century for liberation – that Japanese officials would temporarily continue to run Korea. Korean delegations waiting to greet Americans were fired on – by Japanese police! The Russians pursued an opposite policy. They recognized the “People’s Committees” that the Americans were suppressing. They encouraged Korean initiative when it took the form of ousting the Japanese-appointed puppets, dividing the landlords’ lands, and nationalizing the Japanese-owned industry as the “property of the Korean people.” They especially looked with favor on what they called “mass organizations,” – farmers’ unions, labor unions, women’s associations and unions of youth. The Russian zone in the north fairly blossomed with such organizations energetically building their country after their own desire. From time to time the Americans and Russians held conferences to determine Korea’s future. Nothing came of these talks but increasing bitterness for two years. The Americans insisted on including pro-Japanese quislings and returned exiles in the provisional government. The Russians refused. The Russians insisted on including representatives of the trade unions, the farmers’ union and other similar organizations. The USA would not hear of this.

In North Korea: First Eye-Witness Reports, Anna Louise Strong, 1949

[city-of-ladies]

Genmei (661-721) was Japan's fourth empress regnant. She was Empress Jitō's half-sister and her match in terms of ambition and political skills. Her rule was characterized by a development of culture and innovations. 

Ruling after her son

Like Jitō (645-703), Genmei was the daughter of Emperor Tenji but was born from a different mother. Jitō was both her half-sister and mother-in-law since Genmei had married the empress’ son, Prince Kusakabe (662-689). She had a son with him, Emperor Monmu (683-707). 

Kusakabe died early and never reigned, which led to Jitō's enthronement. The empress was then succeeded by her grandson Monmu. The latter’s reign was short. In his last will, he called for his mother to succeed him in accordance with the “immutable law” of her father Tenji. Genmei accepted. 

Steadfast and ambitious 

Genmei was made from the same mold as her half-sister. She proved to be a fearless sovereign, undeterred by military crises. 

She pursued Jitō's policies, strengthening the central administration and keeping the power in imperial hands. Among her decisions were the proscription of runaway peasants and the restriction of private ownership of mountain and field properties by the nobility and Buddhist temples. 

Another of her achievements was transferring the capital at Heijō-kyō (Nara) in 710, turning it into an unprecedented cultural and political center. Her rule saw many innovations. Among them were the first attempt to replace the barter system with the Wadō copper coins, new techniques for making brocade twills and dyeing and the settlement of experimental dairy farmers.

A protector of culture

Genmei sponsored many cultural projects. The first was the Kojiki, written in 712 it told Japan’s history from mythological origins to the current rulers. In its preface, the editor Ō no Yasumaro praised the empress:

“Her Imperial Majesty…illumines the univers…Ruling in the Purple Pavillion, her virtue extends to the limit of the horses’ hoof-prints…It must be saif that her fame is greater than that of Emperor Yü and her virtue surpasses that of Emperor Tang (legendary emperors of China)”.

In 713, she ordered the local governments to collect local legends and oral traditions as well as information about the soil, weather, products and geological and zoological features. Those local gazetteers (Fudoki) were an invaluable source of Japan’s ancient tradition.

Several of Genmei’s poems are included in the Man'yōshū anthology, including a reply by one of the court ladies. 

Listen to the sounds of the warriors' elbow-guards;

Our captain must be ranging the shields to drill the troops.

– Genmei Tennō

Reply:

Be not concerned, O my Sovereign;

Am I not here,

I, whom the ancestral gods endowed with life,

Next of kin to yourself

– Minabe-hime

From mother to daughter 

Genmei abdicated in 715 and passed the throne to her daughter, empress Genshō (680-748) instead of her sickly grandson prince Obito. This was an unprecedented situation, making the Nara period the pinnacle of female monarchy in Japan. 

Genmei would oversee state affairs until she died in 721. Before her death, she shaved her head and became a nun, becoming the first Japanese monarch to take Buddhist vows and establishing a long tradition.

Feel free to check out my Ko-Fi if you like what I do! Your support would be greatly appreciated.

Further reading

Shillony Ben-Ami, Enigma of the Emperors Sacred Subservience in Japanese History

Tsurumi Patricia E., “Japan’s early female emperors”

Aoki Michiko Y., "Jitō Tennō, the female sovereign",in: Mulhern Chieko Irie (ed.), Heroic with grace legendary women of Japan

[literary-illuminati]

2024 Book Review #41 – Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy by Eri Hotta

Almost everything I know about World War 2, I learned against my will through a poorly spent adolescence and reading people argue about it online. Living in Canada, Japan’s role in it is even more obscure, with the wars in the Pacific and China getting a fraction of a fraction of the official commemoration and pop culture interest of events in Europe. So I went into this book with a knowledge of only the vague generalities of Japanese politics in the ‘30s and ‘40s – from that baseline, this was a tremendously interesting and educational book, if at times more than a bit dry.

The book is a very finely detailed narrative of the internal deliberations within the Japanese government and the diplomatic negotiations with the USA through late 1940 and 1941, which ultimately culminate in the decision to attack Pearl Harbour and invade European colonies across the Pacific. It charts the (deeply dysfunctional) decision-making systems of the Imperial Japanese government and how bureaucratic politics, factional intrigue and positioning, and an endemic unwillingness to be the one to back down and eat your words, made a war with the USA first possible, then plausible, then seemingly inevitable. Throughout this, the book wears its thesis on its sleeve – that the war in the Pacific only ever seemed inevitable, that until the very last hour there was widespread understanding that the war would be near-unwinnable across the imperial government and military, but a broken political culture, the career suicide of being the one to endorse accepting American demands,, and a simple lack of courage or will among the doves, prevented anything from ever coming of it.

So I did know that Imperial Japan’s government had, let’s say, fundamental structural issues when I opened the book, but I really wasn’t aware of just how confused and byzantine the upper echelons of it were. Like if Brazil was about the executive committee – the army and navy ministries had entirely separate planning infrastructures from the actual general staffs, and all of them were basically silo’d off from the actual economic and industrial planning bureaucracy (despite the fact that the head of the Cabinet Planning Board was a retired general). All of which is important, because the real decisions of war and peace were made in liaison meetings with the prime minister, foreign minister, and both ministry and general staff of each branch – meetings which were often as not just opportunities for grandstanding and fighting over the budget. The surprise is less that they talked themselves into an unwinnable war and more that they decided on anything at all.

The issue, as Hotta frames it, is that there really wasn’t a single place the buck stopped – officially speaking, the civilian government and both branches of the military served the pleasure of the Emperor – whose theoretically absolute authority was contained by both his temperament and both custom and a whole court bureaucracy dedicated to making sure the prestige of the throne didn’t get mired in and discredited by the muck of politics. The entire Meiji Constitution was built around the presence of a clique of ‘imperial advisers’ who could borrow the emperor’s authority without being so restrained – but as your Ito Hirobumis and Yamagata Aritomos died off, no one with the same energy, authority and vision ever seems to have replaced them.

So you had momentous policy decisions presented as suggestions to the emperor who could agree and thus turn them into inviolable commands, and understood by the emperor as settled policy who would provide an apolitical rubber-stamp on. Which, combined with institutional cultures that strongly encouraged being a good soldier and not undercutting or hurting the image of your faction, led to a lot of people quietly waiting for someone else to stand up and make a scene for them (or just staying silent and wishing them well when they actually did).

Now, this is all perhaps a bit too convenient for many of the people involved – doubtless anyone sitting down and writing their memoirs in 1946 would feel like exaggerating their qualms about the war as much as they could possibly get away with. I feel like Hotta probably takes those post-war memoirs and interviews too much at face value in terms of people’s unstated inner feeling – but on the other hand, the bureaucratic records and participants’ notes preserved from the pivotal meetings themselves do seem to show a great deal of hesitation and factional doubletalk. Most surprisingly to me was the fact that Tojo (who I had the very vague impression was the closest thing to a Japanese Hitler/Mussolini there was) was actually chosen to lead a peace cabinet and find some 11th hour way to avert the war. Which in retrospect was an obviously terrible decision, but it was one he at least initially tried to follow through on.

If the book has a singular villain, it’s actually no Tojo (who is portrayed as, roughly, replacement-rate bad) but Prince Konoe, the prime minister who actually presided over Japan’s invasion of China abroad and slide into a militarized police state at home, who led the empire to the very brink of war with the United States before getting cold feet and resigning at the last possible moment to avoid the responsibility of either starting the war or of infuriating the military and destroying his own credibility by backing down and acceding to America’s demands. He’s portrayed as, not causing, but exacerbating

every one of Japan’s structural political issues through a mixture of cowardice and excellent survival instincts – he carefully avoided fights he might lose, even when that meant letting his foreign minister continue to sabotage negotiations he supported while he arranged support to cleanly remove him (let alone really pushing back on the army). At the same time, the initiatives he did commit were all things inspired by his deep fascination with Nazi Germany – the dissolution of partisan political parties and creation of an (aspirationally, anyway) totalitarian Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the creation of a real militarized police state, the heavy-handed efforts to create a more pure and patriotic culture. He’s hardly to blame for all of that, of course, but given that he was a civilian politician initially elected to curb military influence, his governments sure as hell didn’t help anything (and it is I suppose just memorably ironic that he’s the guy on the spot for many of the most military-dictatorship-e aspects of Japanese government).

One of the most striking things about the book is actually not even part of the main narrative but just the background context of how badly off Japan was even before they attacked the United States. I knew the invasion of China hadn’t exactly been going great, but ‘widespread rationing in major cities, tearing up wrought iron fencing in the nicest districts of the capital to use in war industry’ goes so much further than I had any sense of. The second Sino-Japanese War was the quintessential imperial adventure and war of choice, and also just literally beyond the material abilities of the state of Japan to sustain in conjunction with normal civilian life. You see how the American embargo on scrap metal and petroleum was seen as nearly an act of war in its own right. You also wonder even more how anyone could possibly have convinced themselves that an army that was already struggling to keep its soldiers fed could possibly win an entirely new war with the greatest industrial power on earth. Explaining which is of course the whole point of the book (they didn’t, in large part, but convinced themselves the Americans wouldn’t have the stomach for it and agree to a favourable peace quickly, or that Germany would conquer the UK and USSR and impose mediation on Japan’s terms, or-).

When trying to understand the decision-making process, I’m honestly reminded of nothing so much as the obsession with ‘credibility’ you see among many American foreign policy hands in the modern day. The idea that once something had been committed to – the (largely only extant on paper) alliance with Nazi Germany, the creation of a collaborator government in China to ‘negotiate’ with, the occupation of southern Vietnam – then, even if you agreed it hadn’t worked out and had probably been a terrible decision to begin with, reversing course without some sort of face-saving agreement or concession on the other side would shatter any image of strength and invite everyone else the world over to grab at what you have. The same applies just as much to internal politics, where admitting that your branch couldn’t see a way to victory in the proposed war was seen as basically surrendering the viciously fought over budget, no matter the actual opinions of your experts – the book includes anecdotes about both fleet admirals and the senior field marshal China privately tearing their respective superiors in Tokyo a (polite) new one for the bellicosity they did not believe themselves capable of following through on, but of course none of these sentiments were ever shared with anyone who might use them against the army/navy.

The book is very much a narrative of the highest levels of government, idea of mass sentiment and popular opinion are only really incidentally addressed. Which does make it come as a shock every time it’s mentioned that a particular negotiation was carried out in secret because someone got spooked by an ultranationalist assassination attempt the day before. I entirely believe that no one wanted to say as much, but I can’t help but feel that people’s unwillingness to forthrightly oppose further war owed something to all the radical actors floating around in the junior ranks of the officer corps who more than willing to take ‘decisive, heroic action’ against anyone in government trying to stab the war effort in the back. Which is something that the ever-increasing number of war dead in China (with attendant patriotic unwillingness to let them die ‘for nothing) and the way everyone kept trying to rally the public to the war effort with ever-more militaristic public rhetoric assuredly only made worse.

That same rhetoric also played its part in destroying the possibility of negotiations with the United States. The story of those negotiations runs throughout the book, and is basically one misunderstanding and failure to communicate after another. It at times verges on comedy. Just complete failure to model the political situation and diplomatic logic of the other party, on both sides (combined with a great and increasing degree of wishful thinking that e.g. letting the military occupy southern French Indochina as a concession for their buy-in on further negotiations would be fine with the Americans. A belief held on exactly zero evidence whatsoever). The United States government was actually quite keen to avoid a war in the pacific if possible, as FDR did his best to get entangled in Europe and effectively start an undeclared naval war with Germany – but the negotiating stance hardened as Japan seemed more and more aggressive and unreliable, which coincided exactly with Japan’s government taking the possibility of war seriously enough to actually try to negotiate. It’s the same old story of offering concessions and understanding that might have been agreed to a few months beforehand, but were now totally unacceptable. In the end, everyone pinned their hopes on a face-to-face diplomatic summit with FDR in Juneau, where sweeping concessions could be agreed to and the government’s credibility staked on somewhere the hardliners could not physically interfere with. The Americans, meanwhile, wanted some solid framework for what the agreement would be before the summit occurred, and so it never did.

After the war, it was apparently the general sentiment that the whole nation was responsible for the war with the United States – which is to say that no individual person deserved any special or specific blame. Hotta’s stated aim with the book is to show how that’s bullshit, how war was entirely avoidable, and it was only do to these small cliques of specific, named individuals that it began. The hardliners like Osami Nagano, but just as much the cowards, careerists and factional partisans like Konoe, Tojo, and (keeper of the Privy Seal) Kido. Having read it I, at least, am convinced.

[mariacallous]

People often say to me that I wouldn’t personally be affected by a second Donald Trump presidency. After all, I live in a blue city in a blue state, and I’m a married, heterosexual woman who isn’t looking to have any more children. I won’t need medication like mifepristone for a miscarriage (though I do have girls in my family who I assume will someday want to have children), and I don’t personally rely on the federal government for education, because my kids don’t go to public school.

So, again, how would any of this affect me? The most likely answer is that, as a public-facing person, I will continue to be subjected to threats, as many in the mainstream media already are. But attacks on the media could escalate if Trump returns to power, given that he doesn’t hesitate to demonize journalists and call them out before his millions of followers. And given what Trump says on television, he may target American citizens for unfavorable speech.

“I think the bigger problem is the enemy from within,” he told Maria Bartiromo on Fox News on Sunday. “Sick people, radical-left lunatics. And it should be very easily handled by, if necessary, by the National Guard, or, if really necessary, by the military.” The “lunatics” in question could be anyone from protesters to opinion columnists—or even mainstream reporters—he doesn’t agree with. Trump has referred to CBS as a “A FAKE NEWS SCAM” whose operations are “totally illegal,” and has similarly suggested that ABC should lose its broadcast license. 

What would it mean to have a president who, in this fashion, targets what little is left of the free press? It’s hard to fathom, but there’s a world where Trump imitates his strongman friends like Vladimir Putin or Viktor Orbán or Kim Jong Un—all of whom participate in jailing or killing journalists in countries with state-regulated media. He’s already taking a page from Joe McCarthy this election cycle in targeting the “enemies within,” something my family is all too familiar with.

Few aspects of Trump’s second-terms plans are more openly authoritarian than his immigration platform. On Friday, Trump traveled to Aurora, a suburb of Denver, Colorado, where he is shopping “Operation Aurora,” a policy he said would target “every illegal migrant criminal network operating on American soil” by use of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798. According to the Brennan Center, the law is “a wartime authority that allows the president to detain or deport the natives and citizens of an enemy nation. The law permits the president to target these immigrants without a hearing and based only on their country of birth or citizenship.” The last time the United States used the Alien Enemies Act, it was to put Japanese and Japanese Americans into internment camps during WWII.

What would internment camps actually entail in the modern day? Well, Trump has talked about deporting up to 20 million undocumented immigrants—an operation of staggering scale that he freely admits will be “bloody.” (The Department of Homeland Security, in 2018, estimated there were 11.4 million undocumented immigrants; Pew put the number at roughly 11 million in 2022.) It’s impossible to imagine what deporting that many people would really look like; maybe blue-state governors would be strong enough to prevent deportation camps from being built in states like California and New York. Maybe the camps would only be in red states, or maybe they’d be erected on federal land, like national parks. Then there’s the question of who would run these camps. Trump, for his part, has mused about using the National Guard. Who would stop any of this, you might ask? Would a Republican Congress stop it? Who would be the grown-ups in the room.

At least during the first Trump administration, the courts prevented Trump from doing some of the things he wanted to do, like ending DACA. But this time, Trump would be starting out with a 6-3 conservative-majority Supreme Court, featuring three justices he appointed. Last year, we saw the Trump-friendly high court issue two rulings that will pretty much serve as a blank check to an emboldened Trump: The first ended the Chevron deference, which will curb the power of federal agencies and expedite the death of regulatory expertise. The other decision, which is perhaps more worrying, Trump would have a blank check to do whatever he wants if he says it’s in the service of the presidency, essentially granting him blanket immunity against any crimes he commits in office. As Ninth Circuit judge and Ronald Reagan appointee Stephen S. Trott wrote, it means that Richard Nixon could have “legally ordered his plumbers to burgle the office of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist.”

Trump is telling us all about his potential plans: internment camps, going after his enemies foreign and domestic, including, presumably, journalists. Will I be one of them? Will he clamp down on the free press? Will he take away the licenses from networks he deems insufficiently supportive of his presidency?

On the campaign trail, Trump has recently posed a question of his own when it comes to voting for him, asking the crowd, “What the hell do you have to lose?” Actually, a lot. While we don’t know precisely what a second Trump term will look like, it’ll surely be chaotic and bleak, and could mark the end of something we certainly don’t want to lose: democracy as we know it.

[signalburst]

Shōgun Historical Shallow-Dive: the Final Part - The Samurai Were Assholes, When 'Accuracy' Isn't Accurate, Beautiful Art, and Where to From Here

Final part. There is an enormous cancer attached to the samurai mythos and James Clavell's orientalism that I need to address. Well, I want to, anyway. In acknowledging how great the 2024 adaptation of Shōgun is, it's important to engage with the fact that it's fiction, and that much of its marketed authenticity is fake. That doesn't take away from it being an excellent work of fiction, but it is a very important distinction to me.

If you want to engage with the cool 'honourable men with swords' trope without thinking any deeper, navigate away now. Beyond here, there are monsters - literal and figurative. If you're interested in how different forms of media are used to manufacture consent and shape national identity, please bear with me.

I think the makers of 2024's Shōgun have done a fantastic job. But there is one underlying problem they never fully wrestled with. It's one that Hiroyuki Sanada, the leading man and face of the production team, is enthusiastically supportive of. And with the recent announcement of Season 2, it's likely to return. You may disagree, but to me, ignoring this dishonours the millions of people who were killed or brutalised by either the samurai class, or people in the 20th century inspired by a constructed idea of them.

Why are we drawn to the samurai?

A pretty badly sourced, but wildly popular history podcast contends that 'The Japanese are just like everybody else, only more so.' I saw a post on here that tried to make the assertion that the show's John Blackthorne would have been exposed to as much violence as he saw in Japan, and wouldn't have found it abnormal.

This is incorrect. Obviously 16th and 17th century Europe were violent places, but they contained violence familiar to Europeans through their cultural lens. Why am I confidently asserting this? We have hundreds of letters, journals and reports from Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch and English expressing absolute horror about what they encountered. Testing swords on peasants was becoming so common that it would eventually become the law of the land. Crucifixion was enacted as a punishment for Christians - first by the Taiko, then by the Tokugawa shogunate - for irony's sake.

Before the end of the feudal period, battles would end with the taking of heads for washing and display. Depending on who was viewing them, this was either to honour them, or to gloat: 'I'm alive, you're dead.' These things were ritualised to the point of being codified when real-life Toranaga took control. Seppuku started as a cultural meme and ended up being the enforced punishment for any minor mistake for the 260 years the ruling samurai class acted as the nation's bureaucracy. It got more and more ritualised and flowery the more it got divorced from its origin: men being ordered by other men to kill themselves during a period of chaotic warfare. I've read accounts of samurai 'warriors' during the Edo period committing seppuku for being late for work. Not life-and-death warrior work - after Sekigahara, they were just book-keepers. They had desk jobs.

Since Europe's contact with Japan, the samurai myth has fascinated and appalled in equal measure. As time has gone on, the fascination has gone up and the horror has been dialled down. This is not an accident. This isn't just a change in the rest of the world's perception of the samurai. This is the result of approximately 120 years of Japanese government policies. Successive governments - nationalist, military authoritarian, and post-war democratic - began to lionize the samurai as the perfect warrior ideal, and sanitize the history of their origin and their heydey (the period Shōgun covers). It erases the fact that almost all of the fighting of the glorious samurai Sengoku Jidai was done by peasant ashigaru (levies), who had no choice.

It is important to never forget why this was done initially: to form an imagined-historical ideal of a fighting culture. An imagined fighting culture that Japanese invasion forces could emulate to take colonies and subdue foreign populations in WWI, and, much more brutally, in WWII. James Clavell came into contact with it as a Japanese Prisoner of War.

He just didn't have access to the long view, or he didn't care.

The Original Novel - How One Ayn Rand Fan Introduced Japan to America

There's a reason why 1975's Shogun novel contains so many historical anachronisms. James Clavell bought into a bunch of state-sanctioned lies, unachored in history, about the warring states period, the concept of bushido (manufactured after the samurai had stopped fighting), and the samurai class's role in Japanese history.

For the novel, I could go into great depth, but there are three things that stand out.

Never let the truth get in the way of a good story. He's a novelist, and he did what he liked. But Clavell's novel was groundbreaking in the 70's because it was sold as a lightly-fictionalised history of Japan. The unfortunate fact is the official version that was being taught at the time (and now) is horseshit, and used for far-right wing authoritarian/nationalist political projects. The Three Unifiers and the 'honour of the samurai' magnates at the time is a neat package to tell kids and adults, but it was manufactured by an early-20th century Japanese Imperial Government trying to harness nationalism for building up a war-ready population. Any slightly critical reading of the primary sources shows the samurai to be just like any ruling class - brutal, venal, self-interested, and horrifically cruel. Even to their contemporary warrior elites in Korea and China.

Fake history as propraganda. Clavell swallowed and regurgitated the 'death before dishonour', 'loyalty to the cause above all else', 'it's all for the Realm' messages that were deployed to justify Imperial Japanese Army Class-A war crimes during the war in the Pacific and the Creation of the Greater East Asian Co-Properity Sphere. This retroactive samurai ethos was used in the late Meiji restoration and early 20th century nationalist-military governments to radicalise young Japanese men into being willing to die for nothing, and kill without restraint. The best book on this is An Introduction to Japanese Society by Sugimoto Yoshio, but there is a vast corpus of scholarship to back it up.

Clavell's orientalism strays into outright racism. Despite the novel Shōgun undercutting John Blackthorne as a white savior in its final pages - showing him as just a pawn in the game - Clavell's politics come into play in every Asia Saga novel. A white man dominates an Asian culture through the power of capitalism. This is orthagonal to points 1 and 2, but Clavell was a devotee of Ayn Rand. There's a reason his protagonists all appear cut from the same cloth. They thrust their way into an unfamiliar society, they use their knowledge of trade and mercantilism to heroically save the day, they are remarked upon by the Asian characters as braver and stronger, and they are irresistible to the - mostly simpering, extremely submissive - caricatures of Asian women in his novels. Call it a product of its times or a product of Clavell's beliefs, I still find it repulsive. Clavell invents (nearly from whole cloth, actually) the idea that samurai find money repulsive and distasteful, and his Blackthorne shows them the power of commerce and markets. Plus there are numerous other stereotypes (Blackthorne's massive dick! Japanese men have tiny penises! Everyone gets naked and bathes together because they're so sexually free! White guys are automatically cool over there!) that have fuelled the fantasies of generations of non-Japanese men, usually white: Clavell's primary audience of 'dad history' buffs.

2024's Shōgun, as a television adaptation, did a far better job in almost every respect

But the show did much better, right? Yes. Unquestionably. It was an incredible achievement in bringing forward a tired, stereotypical story to add new themes of cultural encounter, questioning one's place in the broader world, and killing your ego. In many ways, the show was the antithesis to Clavell's thesis.

It drastically reigned in the anachronistic, ahistorical referencees to 'bushido' and 'samurai honor', and showed the ruling class of Japan in 1600 much more accurately. John Blackthorne (William Adams) was shown to be an extraordinary person, but he wasn't central to the outcome of the Eastern Army-Western Army civil war. There aren't scenes of him being the best lover every woman he encounters in Japan has ever had (if you haven't read the book, this is not an exaggeration). He doesn't teach Japanese warriors how to use matchlock rifles, which they had been doing for two hundred years. He doesn't change the outcome of enormous events with his thrusting, self-confident individualism. In 2024's Shōgun, Blackthorne is much like his historical counterpart. He was there for fascinating events, but not central. He wasn't teaching Japanese people basic concepts like how to make money or how to make war.

On fake history - the manufactured samurai mythos - it improved on the novel, but didn't overcome the central problems. In many ways, I can't blame the showrunners. Many of the central lies (and they are deliberate lies) constructed around the concept of samurai are hallmarks of the genre. But it's still important to me to notice when it's happening - even while enjoying some of the tropes - without passively accepting it.

'Authenticity' to a precisely manufactured story, not to history

There's a core problem surrounding the promotion and manufactured discussion surrounding 2024's Shōgun. I think it's a disconnect between the creative and marketing teams, but it came up again and again in advertising and promotion for the show: 'It's authentic. It's as real as possible.'

I've only seen this brought up in one article, Shōgun Has a Japanese-Superiority Complex, by Ryu Spaeth:

'The show also valorizes a supreme military power that is tempered by the pursuit of beauty and the highest of cultures, as if that might be a formula for peace. Shōgun displays these two extremes of the Japanese self, the savagery and the refinement, but seems wholly unaware that there may be a connection between them, that the exquisite sensibility Japan is famous for may flow from, and be a mask for, its many uses of atrocious domination.'

Here we come to authenticity.

'The publicity surrounding the series has focused on its fidelity to authenticity: multiple rounds of translation to give the dialogue a “classical” feel; fastidious attention to how katana swords should be slung, how women of the nobility should fold their knees when they sit, how kimonos should be colored and styled; and, crucially, a decentralization of the narrative so that it’s not dominated by the character John Blackthorne.'

It's undeniable that the 2024 production spent enormous amounts of energy on authenticity. But authenticity to what? To traditional depictions of samurai in Japanese media, not to history itself. The experts hired for gestures, movement, costumes, buildings, and every other aspect of the show were experts with decades in experience making Japanese historical dramas 'look right', not experts in Japanese history. But this appeal to 'Japanese authenticity' was made in almost every piece of promotional material.

The show had only one historical advisor on staff, and he was Dutch. The numerous Japanese consultants, experts and specialists brought on board (talked about at length in the show's marketing and behind the scenes) were there to assist with making an accurate Japanese jidaigeki. It's the difference between hiring an experienced BBC period drama consultant, and a historian specialising in the Regency. One knows how to make things look 'right' to a British audience. The other knows what actually happened.

That's fine, but a critical viewing of the show needs to engage with this. It's a stylistically accurate Japanese period drama. It is not an accurate telling of Japanese history around the unification of Japan. If it was, the horses would be the size of ponies, there would be far more malnourished and brutalised peasants, the word samurai would have far less importance as it wasn't yet a rigidly enforced caste, seppuku wouldn't yet be ritualised and performed with as much frequency, and Toranaga - Tokugawa - would be a famously corpulently obese man, pounding the saddle of his horse in frustration at minor setbacks, as he was in history.

The noble picture of restraint, patience, refinement and honour presented by Hiroyuki Sanada as Toranaga/Tokugawa is historical sanitation at its most extreme. Despite being Sanada's personal hero, Tokugawa Ieyasu was a brutal warlord (even for the standards of the time), and he committed acts of horrific cruelty. He ordered many more after gaining ultimate power. Think a miniseries about the Founding Fathers of the United States that doesn't touch upon slavery - I'm sure there have been plenty.

The final myth that 2024's Shōgun leaves us with is that it took a man like Toranaga - Tokugawa Ieyasu - to bring peace to a land ripped assunder by chaos. This plays into 19th century notions of Great Man History, and is a neat story, but the consensus amongst historians is if it wasn't Tokugawa, it would have been some other cunt. In many cases, it very nearly was. His success was historical contingency, not 5D chess.

So how did this image get manufactured, to the point where the Japanese populace - by and large - believes it to be true? Very long story short: after a period of rapid modernisation, Japan embraced nationalism in the late 19th century. It was all the rage. Nationalism depends on a glorified past. The samurai (recently the pariahs of Japanese history) were repurposed as Japan's unique warrior heroes, and woven into state education. This was especially heated in the 1920s and 30s in the lead up to the invasion of Manchuria and Japan's war of aggression in the Pacific. Nationalism + militarism = the modern Japanese samurai myth, to prepare men to obey orders unquestioningly from a military dictatorship.

This persists in the postwar period. Every year since 1963, Japan's state broadcaster NHK commissions a historical drama - a Taiga Drama, where many of this show's actors got their starts - that manufactures and re-enforces the idea of samurai as noble, artful, honourable people. Read a book - read a Wikipedia article! - and you'll see that most of it stems from Tokugawa-shogunate era self-propaganda. It's much like the European re-interpretation of chivalry. In Europe's case, chivalry in actual history was a set of guidelines that allowed for the sanctioned mass-rape and murder of civilians, with a side of rules regarding the ransoming of nobles in scorched-earth military campaigns. In Japan's case, historical figures that regularly backstabbed each other, tortured rival warriors and their lessers, and inflicted horrific casualties on the peasants that they owned (we have a term for that) are cast as noble, honourable, dedicated servants of the Empire.

Why does this matter to me? Samurai movies and TV shows are just media, after all. The issue, for me, is that the actors, the producers - including Hiroyuki Sanada - passionately extoll 'accuracy' as if they genuinely believe they're telling history. They talk emotionally about bushido and its special place in Japanese society.

But the entire concept of bushido is a retroactive, post-conflict, samurai construction. Bushio is bullshit. Despite being spoken of as the central tenet of 2024's Shōgun by actors like Hiroyuki Sanada, Tadanobu Asano, and Tokuma Nishioka, it simply didn't exist at the time. It was made up after the advent of modern nationalism.

It was used to justify horrendous acts during the late Edo period, the Meiji restoration, and the years leading up to the conclusion of Japan's war of aggression in the Pacific. It's still used now by Japan's primarily right-wing government to deny war crimes and justify the horrors unleashed on Asia and the Pacific during World War II as some kind of noble warrior crusade. If you ever want your stomach turned, visit the museum attached to Yasukuni Shrine. It's a theme park dedicated to war crimes denial, linked intimately to Japan's imagined warrior past. Whether or not the production staff, cast, and marketing team of 2024's Shōgun knew they were engaging with a long line of ahistorical bullshit is unknown, but it is important.

It's also important to acknowledge that, having listened to many interviews with Rachel Kondo and Justin Marks, they were acutely aware that they weren't Japanese, to claim to be telling an authentically Japanese story would be wrong, and that all they could do was do their best to make an engaging work that plays on ideas of cultural encounter and letting go. I think the 'authenticity!' thing is mostly marketing, and judicious editing of what the creators and writers actually said in interviews.

So... you hate the show, then? What the hell is this all about?

No, I love the show. It's beautiful. But it's a beautiful artwork.

Just as the noh theatre in the show was a twisting of events within the show, so are all works of fiction that take inspiration from history. Some do it better than others. And on balance, in the show, Shōgun did it better than most. But so much of the marketing and the discussion of this adaptation has been on its accuracy. This has been by design - it was the strategy Disney adopted to market the show and give it a unique viewing proposition.

'This time, Shōgun is authentic!*

*an authentic Japanese period drama, but we won't mention that part.

And audiences have conflated that with what actually happened, as opposed to accuracy to a particular form of Japanese propaganda that has been honed over a century. This difference is crucial.

It doesn't detract from my enjoyment of it. Where I view James Clavell's novel as a horrid remnant of an orientalist, racist past, I believe the showrunners of 2024's Shōgun have updated that story to put Japanese characters front and centre, to decentralise the white protagonist to a more accurate place of observation and interest, and do their best to make a compelling subversion of the 'stranger in a strange land' tale.

But I don't want anyone who reads my words or has followed this series to think that the samurai were better than the armed thugs of any society. They weren't more noble, they weren't more honourable, they weren't more restrained. They just had 260 years in which they worked desk-jobs while wearing two swords to write stories about how glorious the good old days were, and how great people were.

Well... that's a bleak note to end on. Where to from here?

There are beautiful works of fiction that engage much closer with the actual truth of the samurai class that I'd recommend. One even stars Hiroyuki Sanada, and is (I think) his finest role.

I'd really encourage anyone who enjoyed Shōgun to check out The Twilight Samurai. That was the reality for the vast majority of post-Sekigahara samurai

For something closer to the period that Shogun is set, the best film is Seppuku (Hara-Kiri in English releases). It is a post-war Japanese film that engages both with the reality of samurai rule, and, through its central themes, how that created mythos was used to radicalise millions of Japanese into senseless death during the war. It is the best possible response to a romanticisation of a brutal, hateful period of history, dominated by cruel men who put power first, every single time.

I want to end this series, if I can, with hope. I hope that reading the novel or watching the 1980 show or the 2024 show has ignited in people an interest in Japanese culture, or society, or history. But don't let that be an end. Go further. There are so many things that aren't whitewashed warlords nobly killing - the social history of Japan is amazing, as is the women's history. A great book for getting an introduction to this is The Japanese: A History in 20 Lives.

And outside of that, there are so many beautiful Japanese movies and shows that don't deal with glorified violence and death. In fact, it makes up the vast majority of Japanese media! Who would have thought! Your Name was the first major work of art to bridge some of the cultural animosity between China and Japan stemming from WW2, and is a goofy time travel love story. Perfect Days is a beautiful movie about the simple joy of living, and it's about the most Tokyo story you can get.

Please go out, read more, watch more. If you can, try and find your way to Japan. It's one of the most beautiful places on earth. The people are kind, the food is delicious, and the culture is very welcoming to foreigners.

2024's Shōgun was great, but please don't let that be the end. Let it be the beginning, and I hope it serves as a gateway for you.

And I hope our little fandom on here remembers this show as a special time, where we came together to talk about something we loved. I'll miss you all.

[justinspoliticalcorner]

Paul Blumenthal at HuffPost:

Former President Donald Trump’s most significant policy plank in his third presidential campaign is to implement a system of mass deportation to remove up to 20 million noncitizens from the United States, a plan that apparently aims to not only remove people living here illegally but also to chase away ― or accidentally round up ― U.S. citizens as well.

He is promising to deploy the military and deputize local police officers to round up millions of people, detain them in makeshift camps and then ship them off to other countries ― whether or not the destination is the person’s country of origin. This plan is billed as targeting only those who have come to the country or reside in it illegally, with a special emphasis on supposed migrant gang members. It offers a story of those who deserve to be here and those who don’t. Those who are part of the national community and those who exist outside its bounds and, perhaps, its laws. But 79% of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. have been living and participating in American communities for more than 15 years. They have married U.S. citizens, hold jobs that prop up their local and national economies and have children and grandchildren who are citizens. Ripping these people out of the country and away from their families will ripple through every community in the country.

“Communities are like a fabric ― the way that the threads are interwoven,” said Heidi Altman, federal advocacy director for the National Immigration Law Center’s Immigrant Justice Fund, an immigrant rights nonprofit. “If you snip at one, eventually the whole of the fabric comes loose.” This plan to tear communities apart will also ensnare U.S. citizens, green card holders and others here legally, either by accident or with intent. Trump and his advisers are already saying that’s what they’ll do. Tom Homan, Trump’s former acting head of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, was asked in a “60 Minutes” interview that aired Sunday whether there is a way that Trump’s mass deportation plan could remove undocumented people without separating them from their families. “Of course there is,” Homan said. “Families can be deported together.” What Homan is saying, without saying it directly, is that mixed-status families, with some family members who are U.S. citizens and others who lack legal status, can choose to self-deport if they wish to remain together.

There are currently 4.7 million mixed-status households in the U.S., according to the Center for Migration Studies. Among those households are 5.5 million U.S.-born children living with one undocumented household member and 1.8 million U.S.-born children living with two undocumented adults. In total, there are 9.7 million Americans who live in households with at least one undocumented resident. Trump and Homan propose an impossible choice: your citizenship and your home or your family. Similar mass deportations and detentions in the country’s history have done the same. The incarceration of Japanese immigrants and Japanese-Americans during and after World War II ensnared citizens and noncitizens alike. So, too, did the imprisonment of Germans, Italians and people born under the Austro-Hungarian Empire during both world wars. Trump’s inspiration for his mass deportation program, President Dwight Eisenhower’s Operation Wetback, similarly resulted in the deportation of significant numbers of U.S. citizens to Mexico.

But none of those programs was of the scale or scope that Trump imagines. There are an estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S., according to the 2022 American Community Survey. Other surveys and estimates have found similar numbers. But Trump and his allies talk about deporting 20 million to 30 million people. There is no source for such a number. That would invariably mean targeting people with some kind of legal status, whether temporary or permanent. “They seem to be gleefully suggesting that they would include people here with some legal status in these roundups,” said Matthew Lisieki, a senior research and policy analyst at the Center for Migration Studies, a think tank that focuses on global migration. A deportation program that removes 11 million people or even more than 20 million would affect every single community in the country, invariably sweeping up even larger numbers of U.S. citizens and legal residents, taking them away from their families and putting them into jails, incarceration camps and, potentially, off to another country. As Homan’s answer on “60 Minutes” indicates, that’s a feature, not a bug. Trump has already proposed invoking laws that could be used to sweep up unnaturalized U.S. residents who have legal status.

The Alien Enemies Act of 1798, which Trump says he will use, allows the president to effectively suspend due process for anyone of a particular nationality or national origin when the U.S. is at war or is invaded by that nation. Invoking this law may prove challenging since the U.S. is not currently in a declared war, much less one against any of the Latin American countries that represent the point of origin for most undocumented immigrants in the U.S. And though Trump claims that the migration of people into the country amounts to an “invasion,” federal courts since the 1990s have largely rejected efforts by states claiming that the word “invasion” in the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted to include the voluntary migration of people across borders.

Still, it is possible that the courts today would take a different approach and declare that the president’s invocation of an invasion by immigrants is a “political question” that the judicial branch will not interfere with. That could give Trump a free hand to implement a brutal and sweeping deportation program. “There are no explicit limitations on what kinds of regulations the president can promulgate under the law,” said Katherine Yon Ebright, a counsel at the progressive Brennan Center for Justice and author of a paper on the Alien Enemies Act. The law has been invoked three times during conflicts with actual foreign nations: during the War of 1812 and both world wars. In each conflict, the president has not only directed deportations and detentions but also promulgated restrictions on noncitizens who had come from the foreign belligerents.

[...]

When Trump was in office, immigration officials ramped up the use of these inaccurate gang databases to identify and deport undocumented residents. Considering Trump has falsely claimed in his campaign speeches that “migrant gangs” have “conquered” entire cities, such an effort would likely be radically scaled up. This could lead to removal of people with legal status as well as those who don’t. Residents who have legal status under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program ― so-called Dreamers who were brought across the border by their parents as children ― have been incorrectly identified as gang members by local police and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. That would be one way to strip them of their legal status.

Trump’s top immigration adviser, Stephen Miller, has promised to “turbocharge” efforts at denaturalizing U.S. citizens. When in office, Trump ramped up denaturalization efforts with one Homeland Security budget document proposing up to 700,000 investigations into naturalized U.S. citizens. Civil denaturalization can be done to people who obtained their legal status illegally or are the child of someone who did so, who deliberately lied about a fact in their application for citizenship, obtained citizenship through military service but was then dishonorably discharged or by becoming a member of a subversive group. This last reason could implicate U.S. citizens incorrectly placed on gang databases or otherwise identified as gang-affiliated by law enforcement. Databases can only be used to identify the legal status of residents who have had interactions with law enforcement or certain government agencies. If Trump intends to ramp up deportations to the level he claims, his efforts would need to target workplaces and neighborhoods. This would, invariably, involve racial profiling by placing checkpoints or performing sweeps in heavily Latino neighborhoods or worksites. Such sweeps would undoubtedly ensnare U.S. citizens and inflict fear in everyone ― citizens and noncitizens alike ― within these communities.

Donald Trump’s diabolically fascistic plan of mass deportations is eerily reminiscent of the interning of Japanese-Americans in World II: a moral and economic calamity that would undo America.

Read the full story at HuffPost.

[apas-95]

I don't think opposing US entry into WWII was the incorrect view? The US had strong ties to Nazi Germany, the US Nazi party was strong, and Franklin Roosevelt agreed with Nazi antisemitism. There was no reason to think the US would do anything other than what they did - rehabilitate and coop fascists into their own empire. The USSR would have won with or without the US joining and, frankly, would have been much better without them. The CPUSA absolutely is revisionist and useless, but that was one area they were right about.

I cannot help but disagree for exactly the reasons you laid out. The US were nazi allies, they just decided, as fascists do, to take over the competing enterprise when they had an opportunity. US-governed Germany or Japan was just as fascist as before, but now was integrated into a much larger project of extermination with a more sustainable methodology - the holocaust by bullet that was visited upon most of eastern europe was replaced with a holocaust by stratofortress and napalm. When the US appropriated half of the Korean peninsula from the Japanese empire it did not do all that much to improve the lot of the Korean people, it just widened the scale of collaboration and allowed the Korean armed forces and KCIA to take part in the massacre of Vietnamese.

For exactly these reasons the US victory in the US-German war (and US-Japanese war) was not a victory for the proletariat, it was a battle between empires where the proletariat were both the prized resource to be won, as well as the blood that fueled the contest of industrial production capability. The CPUSA's decision to cease and condemn anti-government actives and sabotage, in support of the US state's war effort, was a clear and evident failure of policy that had an entire party suddenly stop listening to genuine complaints from striking workers and start jingoistically parroting government slogans about supporting the nation. Germany and the US were and are functionally identical in their nature as bourgeois states, Germany was simply, due to its more developed class relations and contradictions, as well as economic pressure following military defeat, put in a position where it came into conflict with its hostile brother. A manufacturing empire and a merchant empire went to war at sea, and at home their communists sat mutely.

'Conversion of the imperialist war into revolutionary war' is not merely a slogan, it is an inevitable conclusion.

[whencyclopedia]

The Causes of WWII

The origins of the Second World War (1939-45) may be traced back to the harsh peace settlement of the First World War (1914-18) and the economic crisis of the 1930s, while more immediate causes were the aggressive invasions of their neighbours by Germany, Italy, and Japan. A weak and divided Europe, an isolationist USA, and an opportunistic USSR were all intent on peace, but the policy of appeasement only delivered what everyone most feared: another long and terrible world war.

The main causes of WWII were:

The harsh Treaty of Versailles

The economic crisis of the 1930s

The rise of fascism

Germany's rearmament

The cult of Adolf Hitler

The policy of appeasement by Western powers

Treaties of mutual interest between Axis Powers

Lack of treaties between the Allies

The territorial expansion of Germany, Italy, and Japan

The Nazi-Soviet Pact

The invasion of Poland in September 1939

The Japanese attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbour

Treaty of Versailles

Germany was defeated in the First World War, and the victors established harsh terms to ensure that some of the costs of the war were recuperated and to prevent Germany from becoming a future threat. With European economies and populations greatly damaged by the war, the victors were in no mood to be lenient since Germany had almost won and its industry was still intact. Germany remained a dangerous state. However, Britain and France did not want a totally punitive settlement, as this might lead to lasting resentment and make Germany unable to become a valuable market for exports.

The peace terms were set out in the Treaty of Versailles, signed by all parties except the USSR on 28 June 1919. The Rhineland must be demilitarised to act as a buffer zone between Germany and France. All colonies and the Saar, a coal-rich area of western Germany, were removed from German authority. Poland was given the industrial area of Upper Silesia and a corridor to the sea, which included Danzig (Gdánsk) and cut off East Prussia from the rest of Germany. France regained the regions of Alsace and Lorraine. Germany had to pay war reparations to France and Belgium. Germany had limits on its armed forces and could not build tanks, aircraft, submarines, or battleships. Finally, Germany was to accept complete responsibility, that is the guilt, for starting the war. Many Germans viewed the peace terms as highly dishonourable.

The settlement established nine new countries in Eastern Europe, a recipe for instability since all of them disputed their borders, and many contained large minority groups who claimed to be part of another country. Germany, Italy, and Russia, once powerful again after the heavy costs of WWI, looked upon these fledgling states with imperialist envy.

In the 1920s, Germany signed two important treaties. The Locarno Treaty of 1925 guaranteed Germany's western borders but allowed some scope for change in the east. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed by 56 countries. All the major powers promised not to conduct foreign policy using military means. In 1929, Germany's reparations as stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles were reduced from £6.6 million to £2 million. In 1932, the reparations were cancelled altogether. This was all very promising, but through the 1930s, the complex web of European diplomacy began to quickly unravel in a climate of economic decline.

Continue reading...

[djuvlipen]

Wanna learn about women history and WWII? Here is a non-exhaustive list to get you started

German women and the Nazi regime

Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family and Nazi Politics, Claudia Koonz

Female SS Guards and Workaday Violence: The Majdanek Concentration Camp, 1942-1944, Elissa Mailänder

Zwangssterilisation im Nationalsozialismus: Studien zur Rassenpolitik und Frauenpolitik, Gisela Bock

Hitler's Furies: German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields, Wendy Lower

"Backlash against Prostitutes' Rights: Origins and Dynamics of Nazi Prostitution Policies," in Journal of the History of Sexuality Julia Roos

"German Women and the Holocaust in the Nazi East," Wendy Lower, in Women and Genocide, Elissa Bemporad & Joyce W. Warren

Frausein im Dritten Reich, Rita Thalmann

Women as victims or perpetrators of the Holocaust (general)

"Women and the Holocaust: A Reconsideration of Research," in Signs, Joan Ringelheim

Women in the Holocaust, Dalia Ofer & Lenore J. Weitzman

Das KZ-Bordell: Sexuelle Zwangsarbeit in nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslagern, Robert Sommer

SS-Bordelle und Oral History. Problematische Quellen und die Existenz von Bordellen für die SS in Konzentrationslagern, Christa Paul & Robert Sommer

Sexual Violence during the Holocaust—The Case of Forced Prostitution in the Warsaw Ghetto, in Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies, Katarzyna Person

"Gender: A Crucial Tool in Holocaust Research," Marion Kaplan, in Women and Genocide, Elissa Bemporad & Joyce W. Warren

Different Voices: Women and the Holocaust, Carol Rittner & John K. Roth

Resilience and Courage: Women, Men, and the Holocaust, Nechema Tec

« Reframing Sexual Violence as a Weapon and Strategy of War: The Case of the German Wehrmacht during the War and Genocide in the Soviet Union, 1941–1944 », in Journal of the History of Sexuality, Regina Mühlhäuser

Sex and the Nazi soldier. Violent, commercial and consensual encounters during the war in the Soviet Union, 1941-45, Regina Mülhäuser

Romani women during the Holocaust

« Krieg im Frieden im Krieg: Reading the Romani Holocaust in terms of race, gender and colonialism », Eve Rosenhaft

« Hidden Lives : Sinti and Roma Women », Sybil Milton

« Romani women and the Holocaust Testimonies of Sexual Violence in Transnistria », Michelle Kelso

"No Shelter to Cry In: Romani Girls and Responsibility during the Holocaust," Michelle Kelso, in Women and Genocide, Elissa Bemporad & Joyce W. Warren

Jewish women during the Holocaust

Jewish women's sexual behaviour and sexualized abuse during the Nazi era, in The Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality, Beverley Chalmers

Sexual Violence against Jewish Women During the Holocaust, Sonja M. Hedgepeth & Rochelle G. Saidel

Persecution of lesbians by the Nazis

Days of Masquerade: Life Stories of Lesbians during the Third Reich, Claudia Schoppmann

Nationalsozialistische Sexualpolitik und weibliche Homosexualität, Claudia Schoppmann

“This Kind of Love”: Descriptions of Lesbian Behaviour in Nazi Concentration Camps, from Nationalsozialistische Sexualpolitik und weibliche Homosexualität, Claudia Schoppmann

Queer in Europe during the Second World War, Regis Schlagdenhauffen

Ravensbrück

Ravensbrück. Everyday Life in a Woman’s Concentration Camp 1939-45, Jack G. Morrison

Ravensbruck: Life and Death in Hitler's Concentration Camp for Women, Sarah Helm

Women and the Memory of WWII

Women, Genocide, and Memory: The Ethics of Feminist Ethnography in Holocaust Research, in Gender & Society, Janet Jacobs

Lessons Learned from Gentle Heroism: Women's Holocaust Narratives, in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Myrna Goldenberg

« An Austrian Roma Family Remembers: Trauma and Gender in Autobiographies by Ceija, Karl, and Mongo Stojka », Lorely French

Beyond Survival: Navigating Women's Personal Narratives of Sexual Violence in the Holocaust, Roy Schwartzman

Comfort Women and imperial Japan

Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II, Yoshimi Yoshiaki

The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War, George Hicks

The Japanese Comfort Women and Sexual Slavery During the China and Pacific Wars, Caroline Norma

Lola's House: Filipino Women Living With War, Evelina Galang

Soviet Women during WWII

« “Girls” and “Women”. Love, Sex, Duty and Sexual Harassment in the Ranks of the Red Army 1941-1945 », in The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, Brandon M. Schechter

Soviet Women on the Frontline in the Second World War, Roger D. Markwick & Euridice Charon Cardona

Soviet Women in Combat. A History of Violence on the Eastern Front, Anna Krylova

[cathkaesque]

That the Molotov Ribbentrop Pact regularly gets defenders on here is maddening. The points raised in its defence (namely that Stalin tried to solicit an alliance with the British and French and they denied him for anticommunist reasons) are simply not true - there were deep negotiations at the initiative of the Western powers to set up a triple alliance against the Germans. Chamberlain told parliament that they were willing to abandon any ideological misgivings with the Soviets such was the threat of Germany. All attempts by the Germans to solicit an alliance with the Japanese, Italians, and the Poles in 1939 so they could fight the Western powers without worrying about a two front war. Germany's foreign currency reserves were depleted and they were cutting expenditure on the military in 1939 due to the lack of imported raw materials. They only had enough bullets for two weeks of fighting. And then the Pact comes and saves the Germans, providing them with a huge tranche of raw materials in exchange for spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. It was a completely opportunist policy that stabbed the rest of the world in the back and completely failed in all of its objectives.

[seekers-who-are-lovers]

Yukiya in the second part of the Yatagarasu series.

(Please don’t click if you dislike spoilers. I beg you. But if you are not averse to them, then please freely discuss them with me. )

I have to scream !!!

He’s in his 40s “with an elegant appearance.” (One of my fave Japanese fan artists on X has several renditions of him as a middle-aged man. And they are fantastic. )

He’s muscular, hugely built, perhaps like Lord Genya in his prime or his dad Yukimasa (who didn’t look bad at all when he married Fuyuki, thank you to mangaka Natsumi Matsuzaki ), with long, wavy brown hair that has white streaks on it. It reaches the floor when he does a dogeza

He exudes authority, so much authority, so much power, and everyone, mostly, is afraid of him, admires him.

He’s now the leader of the clan. Something like the Prime Minister. He’s called a Yellow Raven, the leader of all government officials. When you let the military take over the government, Yukiya’s government happens. His propaganda re “monkeys” reminds me of a real-life happening where former Philippine president Duterte and his cohorts’ so-called red-tagging and anyone who is a suspected drug user/small-time drug peddler has shoot to kill order. That is, anyone who was not in line with the Duterte government’s policies (mostly political rivals) was part of the communist party/drug addict and therefore needed to be eradicated. Use a magic word, “monkey,” and everything is justified. (I thoroughly understand, on the other hand, Yukiya’s reason that “people are fools”)

He has taken a vow not to marry nor to have children to undertake the role of Yellow Raven, which compared to the others before him, these Yellow Ravens were older and begot children before they got the position. A monk or a priest in Yamauchi means that you don’t belong to any of the four houses and discard the so-called worldly delights.

He doesn’t have a love interest, but that word sparring with (Nazukihiko’s daughter) Himemiya’s other persona is oozing with sexual tension that is palpable to those who have heard them including Haruma, who is his loyal supporter/personal secretary/adjutant (just imagine a mature intelligent man and an intelligent beautiful young woman having a heated political discussion and the young woman is not at all afraid bc darn she knows this person so well as he was like her babysitter/minder/aide/quasi family member/crush when she was young. Well played Chisato Abe, well played !)

He is so disenchanted with life, and vows to hold on to power as long as it takes, yet the appearance of Himemiya’s other persona is about to rock his world

Yes, he has always had this darkness in him, and he lets this darkness prevail because he’s lost those people who have been so close to him, who he loves dearly. AND YET, he never mourned them properly. His heart suddenly closed off like a defence mechanism to assuage the pain that he’d feel. Though there was once an incident when he decided to let go during the first part of the series the reason he was so attached to Himemiya. And when (he thought) Himemiya “rejected” him, it was the day he was convinced that no one really cared. You just watch Episode 11 and listen to Wakamiya talks about Atsufusa and you have in a nutshell Yukiya now. The court will change you.

Anime * Yukiya seems to be a bit gentler. So I don’t know how will they make him so if ever we’ve gotten another season like in the books.

[darkmaga-returns]

Harris is smearing Trump as a fascist, even though ironically, he has been the target of fascist machinations from her own party and supporters for nearly a decade.

By Victor Davis Hanson

October 31, 2024

In the last two weeks, Kamala Harris has been trying to revive her stagnant campaign by smearing Trump as being Hitlerian and a fascist. She claims Trump is planning to put his enemies in encampments.

Yet in the modern era, it was not Trump who put large numbers of U.S. residents and citizens into “relocation camps,” but liberal Democrat President Franklin D. Roosevelt who sent Japanese-American citizens and residents into them.

If Harris refers to Trump’s supposed fascist policies during his prior four-year tenure, there is no such evidence.

Nonetheless, the once “joyful” Harris is ending her campaign by trafficking in lies and smears reminiscent of the Joe McCarthy era.

Recall that fascists hijack law enforcement and the military to suspend constitutional rights and punish enemies. But Trump did neither.

Instead, in 2016, a corrupt FBI went after Trump himself during the Obama administration with the bogus Steele dossier.

The FBI, which in 2016 had hired the faker Steele, in 2020, fused with social media to suppress accurate news reporting of the embarrassing Hunter Biden laptop scandal.

A number of FBI directors and intelligence officials—John Brennan, James Clapper, James Comey, Andrew McCabe—who openly sought to destroy Trump had a long history of either lying or feigning amnesia under oath.

Fascists try to warp the legal system. But Trump’s own Justice Department selected an independent special counsel to investigate the invented Russian collusion accusations against him.

In vast contrast, the Biden Justice Department coordinated with Georgia prosecutors Fani Willis and Nathan Wade, special counsel Jack Smith, Manhattan prosecutor Alvin Bragg, and New York Attorney General Letitia James to prosecute Trump, bankrupt him, and keep off the campaign trail.

Fascists use their governments to destroy their enemies.